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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDRA POLL, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
V . 
JAMES COOK POLL, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
CaseNo.20100765-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant, James Cook Poll, appeals from the trial court's decision 
concluding that approximately 37 acres of land in Wasatch County, Utah and 
related water rights purchased by the parties during the marriage (the "Wasatch 
property") was not marital property subject to equitable division between the 
parties, as reflected in the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered on August 13, 2010. R. 334-43, 344-
47. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Wasatch 
property was not marital property subject to equitable division between the parties? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court will make changes to "a 
trial court's property division determination in a divorce action only if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Olson v. 
Olson, 2010 UT App 22, ^ 7, 226 P.3d 751. The trial court's factual findings on 
which its determination is based are reviewed clear error. Id. at f^ 9. This issue 
was preserved for review by counsel's argument to the trial court and by the 
stipulation of the parties. (R. 321, 332; May 12, 2010 Transcript of Proceedings 
("Transcript") at 198-200;l May 13, 2010 Transcript of Proceedings ("Transcript 
II") at 4-8; May 18, 2010 Transcript of Proceedings ("Transcript III") at 8-10.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Determinative statutory provisions are included in Addendum A. 
1
 None of the three transcripts provided as part of the record to counsel by the trial 
court included a record number on them. Accordingly, citations to these items will 
be cited as noted in the text: "Transcript", "Transcript II", and "Transcript III". 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On January 9, 2009, Sandra filed a Petition for Divorce in the Fourth 
District Court for Utah County. (Record ("R.") at 1-3.) 
2. On January 28, 2009, James filed his Answer to the Petition. (R. at 5-
v.) 
3. Trial of the case was held on May 12 and 13, 2010. (R. at 321, 322.) 
4. At the conclusion of the first day of trial, the court bifurcated the 
proceedings and concluded that the Wasatch property belonged to Sandra as 
separate property and was not marital property, although, through his efforts at 
protecting the property's value, James had earned a "rather nominal" equitable 
interest therein. (R. at 321; Transcript at 116-17, 194-97, 201-03.) 
5. On the second day of trial, instead of evidence being presented to the 
Court concerning the remaining property division issues, the parties reached a 
resolution of the remaining issues. The terms of that resolution were stated on the 
record and included, among others, that the automobiles were to be divided 
between the parties, and that James would be awarded his retirement accounts, all 
of the StimTrainer, stock various pieces of personal property, and a specified sum 
of cash. In exchange, James conceded the "nominal interest" in the Wasatch 
property as well as certain other specific property, but he specifically reserved his 
3 
right to appeal the trial court's determination that the Wasatch property was not 
marital property. (Transcript II at 4-8.) 
6. Thereafter, the Court took testimony from Sandra concerning 
jurisdiction and the legal grounds for a divorce. (R. at 322; Transcript II 10-11.) 
Based thereon, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re 
Bifurcated Divorce and a Decree of Divorce that dissolved the parties' marriage, 
restored Sandra's premarital name, and reserved all other issues. (R. at 325-26, 
327-28.) 
7. On May 18, 2010, the trial court called counsel for the parties into 
chambers, without the parties being present, and held an on-the-record session 
during which it supplemented the record as to its reasons for denying James an 
interest in the Wasatch County property. (Transcript III.) During that session, the 
trial court included among its bases for the decision, the idea that James had 
potentially fraudulently conveyed the property to Sandra to avoid having it used 
for the benefit of creditors. In particular, the trial court concluded that James had 
acted inequitably and therefore could not be heard to complain of the denial of his 
equitable request. (Transcript III at 4-10.) In addition to the Court's 
supplementation, during the in-chambers hearing, counsel for the parties added an 
additional stipulation concerning the allocation of a debt that had not been raised 
during the trial. (Transcript III at 10-11.) 
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8. Thereafter, in conformity with its bench rulings during the trial and at 
the in-chambers hearing, and consistent with the stipulations of the parties, on 
August 13, 2010, the trial court entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Findings") and Supplemental Decree of Divorce ("Decree"). 
(R. at 334-43, 344-47.) 
9. The Findings included the following specific findings of fact: 
15. For the reasons more specifically set forth hereafter the 
court finds the [Wasatch] property to be separate, and is 
awarded to Sandra Poll. 
16. The court finds the $2,253,394.99, and the down payment 
of $50,000, with respect to the Wasatch County property, came 
exclusively from the Petitioner's trust, (Transcript dated May 
12, 2010, page 58 line 17, Transcript dated 18 May page 5 line 
2). This purchase of thirty-seven (37) acres, and a water right 
comprised of 52 shares in Daniel Irrigation Company, was 
purchased in Wasatch County on or about July 20, 2006. 
17. The court finds the real estate purchase contract initiated on 
May 18, 2006 designated the buyer as James C. and Sandra 
Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) 
18. The court finds the Warranty Deed from grantor, Ross 
Ewing Bethers and Juanita K. Bethers, to the grantee, James C. 
Poll and Sandra Poll as husband and wife, was signed on the 
20th day of July 2006. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) 
19. The court finds the Warranty Deed was signed by James C. 
Poll and Sandra Poll on the 16th day of March 2007 with James 
C. Poll and Sandra Poll as grantors, conveying the Wasatch 
County property to Sandra Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) 
20. The court finds there is no dispute with respect to the 
source of the money for the purchase of the Wasatch County 
property. The source was Petitioner's, Sandra Poll's, trust. 
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 58 line 23) 
21. The court finds Mr. Poll asserted that a one-half interest in 
this property had been gifted to him. (Transcript dated May 12, 
2010 page 190, line 11) On direct examination, he claimed that 
the property was a gift. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 
163 line 19) 
22. The court finds Mr. Poll claimed the reason the parties 
signed the Warranty Deed on the 16th day of March 2007 was 
out of concern that potential creditors may be able to reach him 
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personally, acting as President of StimTrainer. He testified 
"That was the sole reason for me" for the transfer of the 
property to Mrs. Poll. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010, page 
166 line 3, and Transcript dated 18 May 2010 page 5 lines 7-
16) 
23. The court finds Mrs. Poll, the Petitioner, testified that she 
never intended to make a gift of the Wasatch County property 
to Mr. Poll. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 44 lines 13-
14) and that shortly after the documents were signed she 
became "terribly concerned." (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 
page 44 line 19, Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 5 line 17) 
24. The court finds that it is undisputed (Transcript dated May 
12, 2010 page 201) that the parties made considerable effort 
throughout the course of their marriage to keep their assets 
separate. The court finds they did join in terms of actual 
operating expenses such as groceries and household goods, but 
there was a continued separation of accounts. (Transcript dated 
May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 17-23) 
25. The court finds the evidence unpersuasive that Petitioner, 
Mrs. Poll, intended to make a gift of any portion of the Wasatch 
7 
County property and the accompanying water right property to 
Mr. Poll. It is undisputed that Mrs. Poll paid the entire 
purchase price of approximately $2,300,000. 
26. The court finds what is more specific and clear about the 
testimony from Mr. Poll that it was his intent to convey this 
property from his estate for purposes of sheltering it from 
creditors, with the specific intent of removing it from his estate 
getting it out of his estate, and restoring it to hers. (Transcript 
dated May 12, 2010, page 202 line 24 through page 203 line 5). 
27. Therefore, the court finds the stronger evidence is that of an 
intention to keep the property separate. In this regard the court 
finds the evidence of Sandy Poll to be credible, and the 
evidence offered by Mr. Poll to be not credible. 
28. The court finds there was little or no credible testimony 
from the defendant regarding the transfer that the parties agreed 
the title, though transferred to Petitioner, would still remain 
joint marital property in terms of specific reference during the 
discussions. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 19-
24). 
29. The court finds it would not be unreasonable to conclude 
that Mr. Poll's objective would constitute a potentially 
fraudulent conveyance. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 6 
line5). The title transfer reflects his intention that his estate not 
include the Wasatch County Property and that it would be the 
separate property of Mrs. Poll. However, now he seeks before a 
court of equity to claim a one-half interest in that property. 
[Paragraphs 30-32 omitted. ] 
33. The court finds a similar principle applies here. Mr. Poll 
claims to have transferred the property for an improper purpose. 
Specifically, " . . . by his own testimony [Mr. Poll] has 
explained the intention of the parties by agreement to convey 
this property from his estate for the purposes of sheltering it 
from creditors with the specific intent of getting it out of his 
2 In the omitted paragraphs of the Findings (R. 335-36), the Court analyzed the 
case of Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95 P.3d 1221. Because this analysis of a 
prior legal case, although contributing to the trial court's thought process in 
making its findings, did not actually constitute findings of fact, it is not included 
here. 
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estate and putting it in hers." (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 
page 203 lines 1-5) 
34. Now Mr. Poll asks a court of equity to reform the very 
deed, which in his view, and if not in his view the court's view, 
had as its objective an improper purpose. He cannot be heard to 
complain even if there had been no actual fraudulent 
conveyance. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 10 lines 3-
5). 
35. The court finds based upon the facts as the court has found, 
combined with the overall history of the respective marital 
contributions, including the substantial losses incurred, and then 
by weighing the equities, the court finds it would not be unjust 
for Mrs. Poll to retain the Wasatch County property and water 
right as her separate property. 
(R. at 334-39.) 
10. In the Decree, the trial court ordered that the "Wasatch County 
property and accompanying water are awarded to Petitioner, Sandra Poll, nka 
Sandra Straub, as her separate property." (R. at 345.) 
11. On September 8, 2010, James filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 351-53.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Testimony of Sandra Poll 
1. Sandra Poll's first husband was killed in the 9/11 terrorist attack on 
New York City on September 11, 2001. (Transcript at 33-34.) As a result, she 
received in excess of $4.8 million from multiple sources. (Transcript at 35.) 
Sandra placed most of those funds into a trust account in her name and distributed 
an unspecified amount to her first husband's children and step children. 
(Transcript at 35-36.) 
2. Exhibit 1 reflects various estate planning documents that Sandra had 
prepared to help her manage these funds. (R. 324, Exhibit 1.) James was never 
made a trustee of the Trust Account; nor was he given a durable power of attorney 
As noted above, the parties stipulated to the division of all of the property at issue 
except for the Wasatch property. This stipulation was made after the trial court 
had ruled that the Wasatch property was Sandra's premarital, separate property. 
Accordingly, the parties' stipulation recognized that the division of property 
included within the terms of that stipulation (that is, all the property except the 
Wasatch property) was equitable. Accordingly, there is no need to evaluate the 
stipulated division in order to evaluate its appropriateness. Because he is 
challenging the trial court's findings of fact concerning the Wasatch property, 
however, James is required to marshal the evidence presented to the trial court that 
might in any way support the trial court's determination on that issue. 
Accordingly, in this factual statement, James includes a description of a significant 
portion of the evidence adduced concerning the parties' other property. 
On occasion, references to James's testimony will also be included in this section 
when it supports or coincides with Sandra's testimony. In such instances, the 
citation will include "accord" before the transcript cite. 
11 
to act for Sandra, even though she had others filling these roles. (Transcript at 78; 
accord Transcript at 162-63.) 
3- The parties became engaged in December 2004 and married on April 
8, 2005. (Transcript at 41, 75.) At that time, Sandra intended for the marriage to 
last for the rest of her life and to provide both parties' children a family 
environment. (Transcript at 75-76; accord Transcript at 121-22.) 
4. During her marriage to James, Sandra had access to and used three 
accounts. (Transcript at 40; R. 324 Exhibit 5.) Specifically, the Sandra Poll Trust 
Account (hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Account") was the trust that Sandra 
had set up for the funds referred to above. (Transcript at 40.) The Sandra Poll 
Personal Checking Account (hereinafter referred to "Sandra's Personal Account") 
was a checking account that Sandra had established prior to the parties' marriage.5 
(Transcript at 40-41.) Sandra's Personal Account was funded entirely by funds 
drawn from the Trust Account. (Transcript at 40-41.) A joint checking account 
("Joint Account") was established shortly before the parties married and was used 
primarily for James' expenses during the marriage. (Transcript at 40.) According 
to Sandra, she paid most of the other expenses such as family related expenses and 
5
 In the interest of full accuracy, the testimony was that Sandra did change the 
banks that Sandra's Personal Account was with after the parties married. 
(Transcript at 41.) James does not assert that the change in banks affected in any 
way the nature of Sandra's Personal Account as premarital, separate property. 
1? 
most of the credit card bills out of Sandra's Personal Account. (Transcript at 40-
41.) 
5. Sandra initially asserted that all of the funds that went into the Joint 
Account were derived from her Trust Account funds (Transcript at 40) but later 
acknowledged that some significant amounts were provided by James (Transcript 
at 78-79). 
6. James never had his name on or signing authority on either the Trust 
Account or Sandra's Personal Account. The only way he could receive funds from 
those was to ask Sandra to withdraw them and give them to him. (Transcript at 80-
81.) In contrast, the parties opened the Joint Account together and both had their 
names on it and had signing authority on it. (Transcript at 84.) 
7. At the time of the marriage, Sandra owned a condominium in 
Massachusetts. (Transcript at 41-42.) Shortly before the marriage, Sandra 
purchased a home in Georgia for $575,000. (Transcript at 42.) Sandra made the 
mortgage payments on the Georgia home for a number of months and then paid off 
the entire balance.6 (Transcript at 42.) After the parties and their children lived in 
Although Sandra did not expressly so testify, it was clear that she meant, and 
James conceded before the trial court, that all of the funds used to pay for the 
Georgia home were Sandra's premarital funds, either directly from the Trust 
Account or from the proceeds of the sale of her Massachusetts condominium. 
(Transcript at 16-17.) 
n 
the home for about three years, the Georgia home was eventually sold for a loss of 
$150,000. (Transcript at 42-43.) 
8. On May 18, 2006, the parties signed a standard Real Estate Purchase 
Contract ("REPC") for the purchase of the Wasatch property for a purchase price 
of $2,300,000 ($50,000 of which was to be paid immediately as earnest money). 
(Transcript at 43; R. 324, Exhibit 2.) The REPC listed "James C. and Sandra Poll" 
as the buyer and included the initials and signatures of each throughout the 
document. (Transcript at 93-94; R. 324, Exhibit 2.) 
9. On July 20, 2006, the parties completed the purchase of the Wasatch 
property and received a warranty deed from the sellers. (Transcript at 43-44; R. 
324, Exhibit 3.) The deed listed the grantees as "James C. Poll and Sandra Poll, 
Husband and Wife". (Transcript at 94-95; R. 324, Exhibit 3.) All of the $2.3 
million used to purchase the Wasatch property came from the Trust Account. 
(Transcript at 43, 93.) 
10. Sandra's purpose in purchasing the Wasatch property was for her and 
James and their children to live on as a family. (Transcript at 47, 96; accord 
Transcript at 158.) Each of the parties had plans for the Wasatch property: Sandra 
wanted to grow an orchard and James wanted build a barn. (Transcript at 96-97.) 
Sandra named a portion of the Wasatch property after James, calling it "James 
Knoll." (Transcript at 97.) 
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11. Sandra testified that James' name was included on the REPC and the 
deed because "[w]e were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about 
it at the time." (Transcript at 44.) She denied that she intended to make a gift to 
James of half the value of the Wasatch property. (Transcript at 44.) Then, she 
testified that she became concerned about his name being on the property shortly 
after they signed. (Transcript at 44.) Specifically, she testified: 
Q. Did there come a time when you became concerned about the fact 
that his name was on the property? 
A I was terribly concerned. 
Q My question is did there come a time? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that time? 
A Shortly after we signed the -
Q Why were you concerned? 
A Because I was afraid of just a situation as this, that - and my 
parents had told me that this could happen as well as my trustee. 
They said these documents need to be in your name. 
(Transcript at 44-45.) 
12. On cross examination, this same issue was covered and Sandra 
testified as follows: 
Q Did you at any time object to having the property put in both your 
names? 
A I don't believe at any time I actually stated that objection, but after 
the fact I was - it became a terrible concern of mine, as I stated 
before. 
Q And that was because your parents were advising you that that was 
a bad move? 
A Well, I knew it was a bad move. 
Q . . . Your parents both advised you that it was bad for you to have it 
in both names? 
A Yes. And my trustee as well. 
Q And when did your trustee give you that advice? 
A I can't give you a specific date. I don't know. 
Q Before - before or -
A Before. 
Q - the purchase? 
A Yes. Before and after. Yes. 
(Transcript at 95-96.) 
16 
13. The parties had considered entering into a prenuptial agreement but 
decided not to execute one. (Transcript at 45.) Sandra testified that she did not 
insist on one because James convinced her not to. (Transcript at 45.) 
14. On March 16, 2007, the parties jointly deeded the Wasatch property to 
Sandra Poll. (Transcript at 45-46, 98-99; R. 324, Exhibit 4.) The reason that 
James gave for deeding the property to Sandra was to avoid difficulties arising out 
of James' role as an officer of StimTrainer.7 (Transcript at 46-47, 99-100.) Sandra 
acknowledged that this was James' sole purpose in deeding the Wasatch property 
to Sandra in her name only and that she was aware of it at the time. (Transcript at 
99-100.) 
15. Sandra asserted that she did not ask James to deed the property to her 
earlier than that because she was afraid of an argument ensuing and because James 
was on occasion "physical." (Transcript at 47.) Sandra felt "[t]remendous relief 
when the property was transferred to her name. (Transcript at 47.) 
16. Sandra testified that she regularly paid the water bills associated with 
the Wasatch property but acknowledged that James had paid one such bill for 
about $400. (Transcript at 48-49; accord Transcript at 166-68.) 
7 • 
StimTrainer, Inc. is discussed in more detail below. 
o 
James denied that any physical altercation was ever started by him; instead, any 
physical action taken by him was in response to Sandra's physical outbursts or 
those of her son, Michael. (Transcript at 181-87.) 
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17. StimTrainer, Inc. is a company that makes an alternative medical 
device. (Transcript at 49.) Sandra was the record owner of 90% of shares in 
StimTrainer, which she obtained from Tom Grant. (Transcript at 49-50, 100.) 
Sandra made over $350,000 in direct payments and in forgiven loans for these 
shares. (Transcript at 50; accord Transcript at 135-40, 144.) 
18. Over time, both parties became involved in the management of 
StimTrainer, James more than Sandra. (Transcript at 101.) In fact, James was 
made president of the company and retired from the military in order to work more 
for StimTrainer. (Transcript at 102.) 
19. Sandra testified about various automobiles and other personal 
property that were owned by the parties at the time of the marriage and that were 
purchased by them during the marriage and the payment of various expenses 
related to James and his children and other family members. (Transcript at 65-71, 
85-90.) In essence, Sandra testified that she paid for all of these items out of her 
personal funds. Additionally, Sandra testified that James provided her with no 
economic benefits except for medical insurance but lived with "essentially no 
living expenses for himself or his family" for the marriage period, even though she 
later acknowledged that he had earned upwards of $180,000 during the marriage 
that was used for himself, his children, and his ex-wife's alimony payments. 
(Transcript at 107, 111.) 
18 
20. Sandra further testified to her personal funds being very nearly 
depleted during the time that she was married to James. (Transcript at 73-74.) 
Testimony of Ben Probst 
21. Sandra presented the testimony of an expert witness, a certified public 
accountant Ben Probst, who testified that the large majority of the funds that went 
into the Joint Account were from either the Trust Account or Sandra's Personal 
Account. (Transcript at 53-58.) Probst acknowledged that James contributed at 
least $26,000 ($19,000 from the sale of James premarital home, as well as a $5000 
deposit on November 30, 2005 and a $2000 deposit on December 20, 2006). 
(Transcript at 56-58; accord Transcript at 125-28.) 
22. Probst testified that all of the funds used to purchase the Wasatch 
property were derived from the Trust Account. (Transcript at 58.) Probst testified 
that Sandra's Georgia home was purchased and its mortgage was paid off with her 
separate funds, as was the case with various other pieces of property. (Transcript 
at 58-59.) 
Testimony of James Poll 
23. Prior to his marriage with Sandra, James was a single father of four 
children on active duty in the military with a normal standard of living. He owned 
a fairly large home with a pool and was paying the mortgage on it, owned a car, 
1Q 
etc. (Transcript at 118.) He had a successful career in the Army. (Transcript at 
118-19.) 
24. When James and Sandra met and eventually decided to get married, 
they both envisioned a life together raising their children from their prior 
marriages. (Transcript at 121.) 
25. Prior to the marriage, a prenuptial agreement was discussed by both 
parties at the urging of her parents and James agreed to it. Sandra eventually 
dropped the idea because she was advised by her trustee Rob Gray that it was not 
necessary, regardless of what her parents thought. (Transcript at 122-23; see also 
Transcript at 78 (identifying Rob Gray as Sandra's trustee).) 
26. James testified that the funds placed in the Joint Account were 
intended to be marital funds. (Transcript at 128.) 
27. James testified that he had a checking account from prior to the 
marriage into which he deposited his earnings and his pension payments. 
(Transcript at 148.) He further testified that the funds in this account were used for 
family purposes similar to how the funds in the Joint Account were used, including 
for gasoline, school supplies, groceries, electronics, clothing (including a suit for 
Sandra's son, Michael). (Transcript at 128-131.) Sandra acknowledged at least 
some of these payments but denied paying a lot of attention to what was being 
done with James checking account. (Transcript at 85.) 
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28. As of the date of trial, James was essentially penniless. (Transcript at 
131.) 
29. James contributed construction/remodeling work on Sandra's Georgia 
house. (Transcript at 131-32, 178-80.) 
30. James was billed over $22,872.61 by the United States government 
for the costs of the parties' move from Georgia to Utah. (Transcript at 133-35.) 
31. In addition to the moneys contributed by Sandra to StimTrainer, 
James also invested some of his funds in the company. (Transcript at 140-41.) 
James also spent substantial time working for StimTrainer, initially while he was 
still with the Army and later after he retired from the military. (Transcript at 141-
43.) James sole reason for leaving the Army was his intent to work for 
StimTrainer. (Transcript at 147-48.) 
32. James testified that he did not request that his name be included on the 
title to the Wasatch property; rather, Sandra did that of her own accord in 
recognition of the fact that the two were married. (Transcript at 161-62.) James 
understood that this meant that the Wasatch property would be marital in nature. 
(Transcript at 163.) 
33. James deeded the Wasatch property to Sandra individually about 
seven months later because as an officer of StimTrainer he was advised to remove 
his name from the Wasatch property. (Transcript at 163-65.) This deeding was 
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done solely for asset protection purposes. (Transcript at 165-66.) Sandra was fully 
aware of that reason. (Transcript at 166.) 
34. Although the parties intended eventually to make the Wasatch 
property their home, they never actually moved to the property. Instead, they 
rented the house there to persons that managed the farm in exchange for rent. 
(Transcript at 168-71.) Of the two parties, James was the one that worked with the 
renters to ensure that the house was being kept up and that the farm was being 
properly managed. (Transcript at 171-72.) 
35. James also contributed to protecting the value of the Wasatch property 
by helping oppose the efforts of a neighboring landowner to effect a condemnation 
of part of the Wasatch property to create an easement and the Wasatch property's 
annexation into a new township or city. (Transcript at 172-78.) 
Expert Report 
36. Finally, the parties stipulated that, if called, James' expert would 
testify to the matters included in his expert report, which was admitted as Exhibit 
18. (Transcript at 193-94; R. 324, Exhibit 18.) The bottom line conclusion of that 
report is that as of April 8, 2010, one month before trial, the Wasatch property had 
a fair market value of $1,650,000. (R. 324, Exhibit 18.) 
22 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
James asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court determining 
that the Wasatch property was Sandra's personal, separate property not subject to 
equitable division. The trial court made two primary factual findings on which it 
rested its determination: 1) Sandra never intended to give James an interest in the 
Wasatch property, and 2) because James engaged in a "fraudulent conveyance," he 
could not ask the court to do equity in his favor by granting him an interest in the 
Wasatch property. In these two findings, the trial court erred. 
First, the facts that Sandra herself admitted to in her testimony establish that, 
contrary to her conclusory assertion that she did not intend to make a gift to James 
of a one-half interest in the Wasatch property, she did in fact intend such a gift. 
This intent is clearly shown in the evidence and requires this Court to reverse the 
trial court's finding to the contrary. 
Second, the elements of "fraudulent conveyance" (now known in Utah as 
"fraudulent transfer") are not met in this case. Even if they were, there is no basis 
for Sandra to be allowed to assert it. Finally, even if the transfer of the Wasatch 
property were a fraudulent conveyance and Sandra were allowed to assert it, the 
effect of that assertion would be to return the property to its prior status, that is, to 
a joint tenancy held by James and Sandra as husband and wife. The case law cited 
by the trial court is easily distinguishable and provides no basis in support of the 
trial court's conclusions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
An appellate court will make changes to "a trial court's property division 
determination in a divorce action only if there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Olson v. Olson, 2010 UT App 22, \ 7, 
226 P.3d 751. The trial court's factual findings on which its determination is based 
are reviewed clear error. Id. ^9. 
II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE 
REVERSED AND JAMES SHOULD BE AWARDED AN 
EQUITABLE SHARE OF THE WASATCH PROPERTY 
A. Sandra Intended the Wasatch Property to Be a Gift to James or 
the Marital Estate 
The law is clear as to the disposition upon divorce of property obtained by 
the parties during the marriage: it is to be distributed between them equitably, 
which generally means equally. Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ^  15, 190 
P.3d 497; Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993); Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990). The law is also clear as to the disposition of 
property that was owned by one of the spouses prior to the marriage: such 
property is generally considered the "separate property" of the spouse that brought 
it to the marriage and it will be returned to that spouse at the time of divorce. 
Thompson v. Thompson, 2009 UT App 101 \ 8, 208 P.3d 539; Kunzler, 2008 UT 
App 263,1| 15.10 
The general rule concerning the disposition of "separate property", however, 
can give way under certain circumstances. 
Separate property can become part of the marital estate and subject to 
equitable distribution if (1) the other spouse has contributed to "the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property," . . . 
(2) "the property has been consumed or its identity lost through 
commingling," . . . or (3) the distribution [of the separate property] 
achieves a fair, just and equitable result." 
9
 "Separate property" also includes property obtained during the marriage by one 
of the spouses by gift or inheritance. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 
(Utah 1988). 
1
 Concerning the proper procedure for accomplishing this division, this Court has 
previously ruled: "After the separate property of each spouse is identified and 
backed out of the estate, the marital property is typically awarded so that each 
spouse receives a roughly equal share." Thompson, 2009 UT App 101, f 9. In this 
case, the trial court followed this procedure by first determining that the Wasatch 
property was the separate property of Sandra and awarding it to her. It then 
proceeded to effect an equitable distribution of the remainder of the property. 
Indeed, inasmuch as the division of the remainder of the property was 
accomplished pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, there can be no claim 
that it was not equitable. Thus, the only question before this Court is whether the 
trial court erred in its determination that the Wasatch property was separate or 
marital in nature. If the Court determines that James' argument on this point is 
correct, the Court should order that James be awarded an equitable share of the 
value of the Wasatch property. The division of the remaining property should have 
no effect on this question. 
Thompson, 2009 UT App 101,^9 (citations omitted; alterations by the court). 
Additionally, separate property becomes marital property "when the acquiring 
spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to 
make it marital property" or "has made a gift of an interest therein to the other 
spouse." Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307, 308; accord Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT 
App 405, f 20, 147 P.3d 464.11 As this Court has previously stated: 
A transfer of otherwise separate property to a joint tenancy with the 
grantor's spouse is generally presumed to be a gift, see 41 
CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 103(a), at 397 (1991) (citing Kramer v. 
Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo.Ct.App. 1986)), and, when coupled 
with an evident intent to do so, effectively changes the nature of that 
property to marital property. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304, 307-08 (Utah 1988); see also Bonnell v. Bonnell, 117 Wis. 2d 
241, 344 N.W.2d 123, 126 (1984) (stating spouse may transfer 
separate property into marital estate and "separate property transferred 
into joint tenancy becomes part of the marital estate"); cf. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (finding trial court did not 
abuse discretion in awarding home held in joint tenancy to wife when 
"there was no intention by [wife] to create a one-half property interest 
Whenever the trial court determines that previously separate property has 
become marital property, it must make findings of fact sufficient to justify the 
decision. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1170. 
In this case, neither party argued that otherwise separate property became 
marital property through protection, maintenance, or enhancement of value, 
through commingling, or pursuant to the needs of fairness, justice, and equity. 
Accordingly, the only issue is whether Sandra made a gift of the Wasatch property 
to James or to the marital estate or otherwise titled the property in a manner 
indicative of an intent to add that property to the marital estate. Kunzler v. 
Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, f 21 (declining to address possible arguments in 
support of reversal that neither party adequately raised before the trial court). 
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in [husband], nor any expectation by [husband] that he had received a 
one-half property interest"). 
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, \ 22, 993 P.2d 887. 
In this case, James is asking the Court to review and reverse the trial court's 
factual finding that Sandra did not make a gift of the Wasatch property to the 
marital estate or to James and that the placing of the Wasatch property in both their 
names did not evidence an intent to make it marital property. For the reasons 
shown below, the trial court's findings were in error and this Court must reverse 
them. 
Under the marshalling requirement applicable to requests to reverse factual 
findings, James has provided in his Statement of Facts above all of the evidence 
that could be construed to support the trial court's findings on this matter. This 
evidence is reviewed again here in this section together with the contrary evidence. 
There are a number of facts that are not in dispute. The undisputed facts 
show that, after joint discussion, James and Sandra both signed the REPC 
obligating both of them to pay $2.3 million dollars for the purchase of the Wasatch 
property. (Transcript at 43, 93-94; R. 324, Exhibit 2.) The entire amount of the 
purchase price was derived from Sandra's separate, premarital property, i.e., the 
Trust Account. (Transcript at 43, 93.) The parties both intended to live there 
together as husband and wife and to raise their children there. (Transcript at 47, 
96, 158.) The Wasatch Property was deeded to the parties in both their names, as 
husband and wife.12 (Transcript at 43-44, 94-95; R. 324, Exhibit 3.) 
The fact that the Wasatch property was deeded to both parties as joint 
tenants, under Bradford, raises the presumption that it was a gift. Thus, if the 
evidence showed at trial that Sandra had "an intent to do so," the formerly separate 
property would have become marital property. 
Sandra argues that there was no such intent. Indeed, she explicitly testified 
to that effect. 
Q Okay. Now, why was Mr. Poll's name included on those 
documents [i.e., the REPC and warranty deed]? 
A We were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about 
it at the time. 
Q Okay. Did you intend at that time to make him [James] a gift of 
$1,150,000? 
A No. Absolutely not 
(Transcript at 44.) This testimony, which was given approximately four years after 
the fact and after a dispute had arisen between the parties and her motivations 
would have changed, is the only direct evidence supporting the trial court's 
12
 In Utah, when "real estate [is] granted to two persons in their own right who are 
designated as husband and wife in the granting documents, unless severed, 
converted, or expressly declared in the grant to be otherwise." the presumption is 
that they take the property as joint tenants. Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-5(l)(a). There 
was no evidence presented to the trial court to contradict this presumption. 
Accordingly, James and Sandra held the Wasatch property as joint tenants. 
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determination that she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property. For 
the reasons shown below, however, this conclusory assertion is too thin a reed on 
which to rest Sandra's argument and the trial court's finding. 
It can be expected that Sandra will argue that other evidence supports the 
trial court's finding. Proper analysis, however, establishes that any such evidence 
fails to do so. For instance, Sandra testified that shortly after they signed, she 
became concerned of a situation in which the property's nature would be at issue. 
(Transcript at 44-45.) Similarly, she testified that she did not ask James to deed the 
property back to her because she wanted to avoid an argument. (Transcript at 47.) 
Whatever Sandra may have felt or thought after the documents were signed does 
not provide evidence of what her intent was at the time of the signing which, under 
Mortensen, is the crucial issue. Mortens en, 760 P.2d at 307 (separate property 
becomes marital property "when the acquiring spouse places title in their joint 
names in such a manner as to evidence and intent to make it marital property." 
(emphasis added)). 
The trial court found that it was undisputed "that the parties made a 
considerable effort throughout the course of their marriage to keep their assets 
separate [and] there was continued separation of accounts." Findings ^ 24. Sandra 
can be expected to argue that this finding also supports the trial court's finding that 
there was no intent to make the Wasatch property part of the marital estate. A 
proper analysis, however, leads to precisely the opposite conclusion. Specifically, 
when the parties have a track record of keeping assets separate and have shown the 
ability to do so, the fact that on one particular occasion they acted in a contrary 
manner evidences that they intended a different result than their usual course of 
action. That is what happened here. 
In this case, the testimony was clear that James was not added to Sandra's 
Personal Account or to the Trust Account. (Transcript at 80-81.) Nor was he 
given her power of attorney. (Transcript at 78.) The reason for that is also clear: 
these accounts were not to be considered his property in any way. (Transcript at 
80-81; accord Transcript 162-63.) In contrast, the Joint Account was opened by 
them both and treated as marital property with both of their names included on it. 
(Transcript at 84.) Accordingly, the fact that the parties kept their property 
separate in most instances does not support, but rather undermines, the trial court's 
finding that there was no intent to make the Wasatch property part of the marital 
estate because it was not kept separate by the parties. 
Accordingly, beyond Sandra's conclusory testimony, there is no evidence 
that she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property. Under the 
marshaling requirement, however, to obtain a reversal, James must demonstrate to 
this Court the "fatal flaw" in the trial court's findings. W. Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, there is such a fatal 
flaw. 
Specifically, Sandra testified that she was worried about having the Wasatch 
property in both parties' names. (Transcript at 44.) This worry was based on her 
parents and her trustee telling her that the property needed to be in her name only. 
This advice gave her cause to fear "just a situation as this, that - and my parents 
had told me that this could happen as well as my trustee." (Transcript at 44-45.) 
On cross-examination, Sandra clarified that she had been given this advice before 
she signed the documents. In other words, she was made aware of the fact that 
putting the property in both names would expose it to a claim that it was marital 
property, subject to division in case of a divorce. Despite having received this 
advice, she proceeded to sign the documents that placed the property in a joint 
tenancy. This is evidence so strong that it cannot properly be ignored or 
contradicted. This is the fatal flaw, the point where the trial court made its crucial 
error in its findings. The clear weight of the evidence, that is, evidence presented 
by Sandra herself, establishes that the trial court erred in finding that she did not 
intend to make the Wasatch property part of the marital estate.13 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that Sandra's earlier testimony on direct 
examination that she did not think about why James' name was to be put on the 
deed (Transcript at 44) is inherently not credible in light of her later testimony that 
she was given specific advice before the transaction about the advisability of 
having his name on the property (Transcript at 95-96). 
Accordingly, the trial court was presented with a situation where the 
Bradford presumption governed. There was property granted to a husband and 
wife in joint tenancy and there was evidence of Sandra's intent to make the 
property marital in nature. That results in the property becoming marital property, 
properly subject to division by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's 
determination that the Wasatch property was not marital property was clearly 
erroneous. 
B. James Did Not Fraudulently Transfer the Wasatch Property So 
As to Forfeit His Beneficial Interest Therein 
In what was effectively an alternative holding, the trial court further found 
that, even if the Wasatch property had become marital property, it lost that status 
when, in March 2007, James deeded it to Sandra in her own name only. In 
particular, the trial court held that the transfer of the Wasatch property was the 
equivalent of a fraudulent conveyance which was inequitable conduct by James 
and that thus precluded him from sharing in the value of the property. Again, the 
trial court clearly erred in this finding. 
It is further supported by the fact that after the parties signed the REPC, if Sandra 
had changed her mind and had not been willing to fund the purchase, James would 
have been liable, jointly and severally, for the entire unpaid balance owing on the 
$2.3 million obligation. 
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1. The Title Name Is Not Controlling in Determining to Whom 
Marital Property Should Be Awarded 
Since, as shown above, the Wasatch property was made marital property by 
Sandra's agreeing to have it deeded to both parties as joint tenants and her intent 
that it be so conveyed, the next question is what effect the subsequent transfer from 
joint tenancy to Sandra individually had on the property's character. First, it is 
basic Utah law that the distribution of marital property does not depend on whose 
name the property is titled in. "Plaintiffs attempt to classify all properties acquired 
during the marriage as his separate property is of no avail. The fact that title was 
not in their joint names and that the properties were purchased with funds 
generated from his other rental properties is not determinative of the distribution to 
be made." Huckv. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986). Rather, as noted above, 
marital property is to be distributed equitably (which generally means equal shares) 
between the two parties, Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263 f 15; Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022; 
Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172, and this is regardless of the names on the titles to the 
individual pieces of property. Accordingly, the simple fact that the parties chose to 
re-title the Wasatch property, standing alone, does not change the fact that James is 
entitled to an equitable share therein.14 
Indeed, even in the commercial context, the deeding of a title to another does not 
necessarily indicate an intent to convey a particular interest and parol evidence 
may be required to determine such intent. "We think these cases are applicable, 
however, to illustrate that the mere transfer of a warranty deed does not 
TQ 
It makes sense that, just as separate property can be given to the marital 
estate, marital property can be given to the separate estate of either party. The 
same requirement that re-titling of the property be accompanied by an intent by the 
grantor to alienate the property from the estate in which he or she has an interest 
should apply equally. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ^ j 22 (holding that the nature 
of the property changes only "when coupled with an evident intent to do so"). 
In this case, Sandra conceded that the sole intent that James had in deeding 
the Wasatch property into her name only was to protect it from creditors, not to 
effect a change of his interest in the property as it might relate to Sandra: 
Q Did he [James] give you reasons for having signed that document 
[i.e., the deed transferring the Wasatch property to Sandra's 
name]? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q What was your response to whatever reasons he gave you? 
A I didn't particularly care what the reason was. I was grateful and 
relieved to have the document to - to have the deed back in my 
name. 
Q Okay. The - did he give you an explanation of why, or did anyone 
give you an explanation of why they were transferring it to you? 
A Yes. 
Q And-
automatically establish that the parties intend a conveyance." Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp,, 813 P.2d 104, 111 (Utah 1991). 
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A It was felt that it would be a good idea, that with regard to 
StimTrainer it could be under dispute if there were any difficulties 
with StimTrainer because he was an officer of the company and 
the company had some difficulties with creditors. 
(Transcript at 46-47.) Additionally, she testified: 
Q Okay. Do you recall that about this same time there was another 
shareholder [of StimTrainer] that was somewhat disgruntled with 
the company and how it was proceeding? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you recall that advice was given to Mr. Poll that the 
company could not afford liability insurance for him and so he 
should take steps to protect his assets? 
A I don't particularly remember it that way, but I think that was the 
general idea. Yes. 
Q And you acknowledge that when James Poll signed Exhibit 4 to 
transfer the title out of his name into your name alone, that was his 
purpose in doing so? 
A That was his purpose in doing so, yes. And I was grateful he did 
so. 
(Transcript at 99-100.)15 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the only conclusion that can be drawn is 
that James intended to transfer only legal title from the marital estate to Sandra. 
There is no evidence of any kind in the record to indicate that James intended to 
give up his equitable interest in the Wasatch property. Accordingly, James 
James provided testimony to the same effect. (Transcript at 163-166.) 
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retained his equitable interest in the Wasatch property and the trial court erred in 
not granting him a share of its value as part of the property division in this case. 
Indeed, the trial court did not hold to the contrary. 
2. There Was No Fraudulent Transfer 
The trial court's stated reason for its alternative holding which denied James 
an interest in the Wasatch property after having deeded it over to Sandra was the 
fact that such transfer had the appearance of a fraudulent conveyance.16 In this 
analysis, the trial court erred. 
Under Utah law, the elements of the various types of fraudulent transfer are 
spelled out in the in Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-5 and -6 (the full terms of these 
statutory provisions are included in the Addenda). Under each of these sections, it 
is clear that there can be no fraudulent transfer unless there is a "creditor". 
Sections 5 and 6 each provide that a "transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as 
to a creditor . . . if . . . ." (Emphasis added.) A "creditor" is defined as a person 
that has a "claim." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4). A "claim," in turn, is defined as 
"a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to a judgment, liquidated, 
16
 Utah's Fraudulent Conveyances statute (Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16) was 
repealed in 1988 and replaced with the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -14 (the "Act"). Accordingly, the use by the trial court 
and Sandra's counsel of the term "fraudulent conveyance" was anachronistic. This 
brief assumes that reference to "fraudulent transfer" was what was intended by the 
trial court in making its findings. 
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unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3). 
In this case, there was evidence presented at trial that StimTrainer and its 
officers and advisors were concerned that there might be the assertion of a "claim" 
by a particular shareholder. There was no evidence that any claim was actually 
ever asserted. Nor was there evidence that even if there had been an assertion of 
such a claim that the claim would have been sustained. Certainly there was no 
evidence that StimTrainer's officers and advisers were willing to concede liability 
to the disgruntled shareholder. All of this establishes that there was no actual 
"claim" in this case and without a claim there could be no "creditor." Accordingly, 
there was no fraudulent transfer made by James in this case. This conclusion is 
further strengthened by the fact that the transfer was made on the advice James and 
Sandra received from StimTrainer's leadership team. (Transcript at 99-100, 164-
66.) 
Additionally, the evidence was clear that James and Sandra jointly 
participated in this transfer. Compare R. 324, Exhibit 4 (showing both Sandra's 
and James' signatures on the deed) with Transcript at 44-45, 99-100 (showing that 
Sandra knew full well the purpose behind the transfer and that she did not care 
about the reasons). Essentially, this means that, if the deed did represent a 
fraudulent transfer, Sandra was equally willing to defraud James' creditors out of 
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this asset. Sandra's inequitable conduct, however, was more extensive that James 
because she was willing to defraud James as well. She knew full well that the 
purpose of the transfer was solely to protect the property from third-party creditors, 
not to effect a change in the beneficial interest that each of the parties had in it. 
Moreover, if the transfer of the Wasatch property to Sandra alone were in 
fact a fraudulent transfer, the statute is clear as to what the remedy is: the transfer 
may be avoided to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim. Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-6-8 (the full statutory provision is included in the Addenda). In this 
case, there is no creditor; there is no claim; there is no need for a remedy. But if 
the Court were to effect such a remedy, it would simply avoid the transfer and act 
as though the transfer never occurred. In other words, the Wasatch property would 
be treated as if it remained in both James' and Sandra's names. 
The trial court relied on the case of Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95 
P.3d 1221, as a justification for its decision. That case is distinguishable from the 
instant matter. In Hone, two brothers, Alton and Lloyd Hone, had an elderly 
mother, Alta Hone, who needed institutional care. Alta, Alton, and Lloyd were all 
trustees of a trust of which Alta was the beneficiary. The two brothers wanted to 
obtain Medicaid payments for that care but Alta was ineligible as long as her 
family homestead was located in the trust. After discussions with Medicaid 
officials, the Hones learned that, because Lloyd had lived in the home for a 
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sufficient time and because he too was disabled, if the trust transferred the entire 
interest in the homestead to him, Alta would qualify for Medicaid benefits. 
Accordingly, the trust executed the documents necessary to effect the transfer, thus 
allowing Alta to receive the government benefits. In doing so, Lloyd orally 
promised Alton that he would transfer the home back to the trust upon Alta's 
death. After Alta dies, Lloyd refused to transfer the house back to the trust. Alton 
then brought suit against Lloyd on behalf of the trust to recover the residence. 
The trial court refused Alton's request and this Court affirmed that decision. 
The reasoning was that, if Lloyd's promise to return the home to the trust was 
enforceable, then the Hones had all participated in a scheme to illegally obtain 
government benefits because Alta would qualify for Medicaid benefits only if the 
trust's entire interest were transferred. 
Thus, insofar as Lloyd Hone's verbal promise to reconvey the 
property upon Alta's death is enforceable, the original transfer did not 
transfer all property rights to Lloyd Hone, but rather resulted in Lloyd 
Hone holding the property in trust for the Trust. 
This creates a dilemma for Alton Hone. On the one hand, there 
are no legal grounds to reform the deed and place ownership of the 
Homestead back in the Trust unless Lloyd Hone's promise is legally 
enforceable on equitable grounds. On the other hand, insofar as Lloyd 
Hone's promise to reconvey is legally enforceable, the original 
transfer, which Alton approved, was a sham designed to deceive 
Medicaid. As the trial court recognized, Alton cannot maintain both 
(1) that he did nothing wrong when he represented to Medicaid as a 
trustee of the Trust that the Homestead had been transferred to an 
eligible transferee, Lloyd Hone; and (2) that Lloyd Hone always was 
legally obligated to transfer the property back to the Trust upon Alta 
^o 
Hone's death. Because Alton maintains that Lloyd Hone's promise is 
enforceable, he deceived Medicaid when the property was originally 
transferred. 
Hone, 2004 UT App 241, ffif 8-9 
In this case, James never deceived anybody. There never was a fraudulent 
transfer. There never was a victim. James never mistreated or maltreated 
anybody. At most, what James did is what is commonly referred to as "asset 
protection." Simply putting one's assets in a position where they are less likely to 
be subject to collection is not fraudulent; it is prudent. An entire branch of the 
legal profession is dedicated to this area of practice. And every step taken in 
furtherance of asset protection is designed to make collection against the assets 
more difficult by potential creditors. Only when there is an actual creditor with an 
actual claim (and when the other requirements of the statute are present) does such 
transferring become fraudulent. In this case, there was no creditor and no claim. 
Without those, James' action could not be fraudulent. Nor can Sandra complain of 
those actions: she was a willing participant in them. The actions taken by James 
were designed to protect her as well as him. 
Unlike Alton Hone's argument to the court, there is nothing inconsistent 
with James' position. James' position is that he transferred only legal title to the 
Wasatch property to Sandra but retained a beneficial interest therein. That position 
does not put him in violation of the Act. If the transfer could be rescinded under 
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the A et, it eoiih 1 be rescinded w 1 lethei ill v v < is < 1.1 i ; u isfi ;i c >f < n \b ' legs il title - -i < )f I > >1 1 : 
legal ai id bei leficia 1 title 
I <ii iall> , 1 1 le < i pplic :< il ioi I of 1 1 le fraudulent transfer concept in a situation such 
as this is inconsistent with the rule that has been the law oi" Utah ioi decade-,: . . - . , 
that the division nf marital property will i lot be c o m - >iVd ^} ^ hich of the parties 
holds legal title thereto, Huck, 734 P.2d at 420. It is not u n c o m m o n for spouses, 
using marital funds, to uhLm. u.,:> i^.> ,;;-; p u i ^ L;.^-J. < . .he name o< : e 
be somewhat quest ionable in light of the Act, if this argument is recognized as a 
basis for denying the distribution of marital i ^y - s r i } r one spouse or another, r 
will open the door to unscrupulous practices between divorcing spouses. In 
particular, one spouse will be able to defraud the othvi by encouraging the 
potential). The first spouse could then file for divorce and claim the other spouse 
(1) gave up any interest in the marital property by approving the titling in oi le 
name only and (2) is precluded from arguing to the contrary because of some 
"fu- argument applies equally whether it is applied to the situation where the 
unscrupulous spouse has a present intent to divorce or is simply taking steps to 
protect his or her own interests in case a divorce happens later on. 
A\ 
inchoate intent to defraud some potential creditor that the parties were concerned 
about. The Court should not adopt a rule that would foster fraud and distrust 
between spouses. 
C. There Are No Other Equitable Arguments That Justify a Total 
Denial to James of Any Share in the Wasatch Property 
Although the trial court did not expressly include in its oral ruling any other 
basis for its findings and conclusions that James should not share in the Wasatch 
property, it did include as a written finding, the following: 
The court finds based upon the facts as the court has found, 
combined with the overall history of the respective party's marital 
contributions, including the substantial losses incurred, and then by 
weighing the equities, the court finds it would not be unjust for Mrs. 
Poll to retain the Wasatch County property and water right as her 
separate property. 
(R. at 334-35 (f 35)). In other words, the trial court found two additional bases 
that justified characterizing the Wasatch property as Sandra's separate property: 
(1) the overall history of the parties' marital contributions, and (2) the substantial 
losses suffered. 
1 O 
The record does not justify these determinations. First, the overall history 
shows that both parties contributed financially to the marriage. The trial court 
James assumes that the trial court did not intend to make these findings based on 
Sandra's status as a widow, let alone a 9/11 widow. Such would be arbitrary and 
capricious. Whether the trial court reached the correct conclusion in this matter or 
whether James' position is correct, it should be equally applicable in a similar case 
where the divorcing party was a non-9/11 widow, had received substantial funds 
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found that James "!" IM id essei itiall> i J • I I • i i lg e x:pei ises' ' ' < ii u ii ig tl le 1 ii m :; < )f 1 1 :n 
oi c i i; i K >rtgage, ii is clearly accurate. Sandra clearly did provide that economic 
contribution to the marriage. 
To the extent that the trial court meant that James had no expenses at all and 
did not pay for family expenses, however, it was clearly erroneous. " b irsl, Sandra 
acknowledged that during the marriage James carnal nitm llian $ I MO,(Hill (ml ll I 
^.!- • * .,. u>. .! , i home ('Tninseripl ill I I I I 
* * : • - : siifled ihat, except for the S10,000 down 
payment on the pickup truck, he paid for the entire vehicle out of the funds he was 
earning. (Transcript at 86-8", : ; Similarly, James testified without 
contradiction that he paid out of the funds he was earning "gasoline, clothing, 
electronics, sc ;;nngs, groceries, clothing," including a su ^ , .. •< 
nl A«. I'MIIIII 'Vere used extensively for family purposes." (Transcript, at 
derived from a prior divorce, or was simply independently wealthy. The source o\ 
the separate property brought to the marriage is irrelevant when that property has 
been given to the other party or to the marital estate. 
Such a conclusion would be impossible to square with the trial court"^ * •* .ii 
finding: "I do not conclude that the parties dhJ u j hake considerable separate 
contributions to the marriage, and they have been articulated lo some degree in 
terms of contributions to marital expenses, repair of the Georgia home ano \s ha* 
not." H ran script at °0^ ) 
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130.) Although given the opportunity to refute the idea that James paid for 
substantial expenses out of his account, Sandra denied knowing what was done 
with his account. (Transcript at 85.) Additionally, James was the party billed for 
the costs of the family's move from Georgia to Utah. (Transcript at 133-34; R. 
324, Exhibit 16.) 
More importantly, which of the two parties paid the bills during the marriage 
is not a relevant consideration in determining whether Sandra had the intent, at the 
time, to contribute the Wasatch property to the marital estate. This is the 
controlling question; not who paid for the groceries. 
The "losses" referred to in paragraph 35 of the Findings appear to refer to 
the loss that was suffered when Sandra sold her Georgia home for approximately 
$150,000 less than she purchased it for (R. 341 (Findings % 12); Transcript at 107) 
and possibly to the loss of funds invested in StimTrainer. Neither of these losses 
justifies a denial of James' marital interest in the Wasatch property. First, the 
Georgia home was Sandra's separate property. As such, she is the only one that 
stood to gain substantially if the market had risen while she held it. Because James 
would have had no claim to any such appreciation if it had occurred, he should not 
dd 
be held i espoi: isible ii 1 ai 13 \ v a;; foi tl: le loss tl: lat« 3cci 11: 1 ed di :ie to i 1: larket 
fh icti lations * ': ' ' ; * ' 
In the case of the St imTrainer stock, there was no evidence of loss presented 
at trial, certain!) noth ing quantif iable. ' I he re was no evidence presented at trial as 
to w hat the value of the St imTrainer shares were at any t ime other than when they 
were purchased Micro sunp i \ is not su i : i uen i * \ idcnc*. • l»\ U O K H m e n ~ourt 
<~ . . i.i* e conc iudea tnai 1 . . . .; , . . .. ,;. .. • unci snares resulted in any 
Next , there was ev idence that, as of the dale 1 .»= s ' v v \\ a- • 
$520,000 left of the mi l l ions that Sandra had at the beginning of the marn ^ e . 
Specifically, she testified that there was only $130,000 left in the Trust Account . 
(Transcript at 72.) In addit ion, she recognized the $390,000 that was the proceeds 
from., the sale of her Georg ia home . (Transcript at 7.2 ) I ( 01 tl iree reasons,, tl: lis 
testin 101 i..y, 1: IOV • e < ei Is 1: 1 :::) t a propel basis :fo a coi icli isic 1: 1 tl: 1a t thei e wei e • ' 
substantial losses that should preclude James froi 1: 1 part icipat ing ii 1 the \ ah le of tl: :ie 
Wasatch property. First , this tes t imony complete ly ignores the value of the 
Wasatch property. T h e unrebut ted evidence at trial was that the Wasatch... property 
The result might be different if i h u v were evicience that James had c a u ^ d li-i 
loss in value that Sandra sustained on her ( icorgia home Rut there w as u< -JK 
evidence at all presented 10 ti-„« ir".,1 ,,,.. ; Indeed, the c\ idencc was lo t h 
contrary, that James , Ihrwigh his work, improved Sandra ' s ( ieorgia honk 
(Transcript at 178-80.) 
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at that time had a value of $1.65 million. Second, there was no testimony as to 
what caused the "losses" of Sandra's millions. It could have been poor investing 
decisions on her part, joint spending by James and Sandra, or even spending by her 
alone. To the extent that the money was gone because of spending decisions, 
whether by James or Sandra, it cannot really be termed "losses." Third, to the 
extent that the "losses" were caused by bad investments (which is entirely 
plausible given that these losses occurred during the same time as the severe 
recession and bear market that this country has recently experienced), that can 
hardly be blamed on James and he should not be held responsible for that. 
Finally, the trial court completely ignored the equities that weighed in favor 
of James. First, when he came to the marriage, he owned a nice residence with 
significant equity. (Transcript at 118-19.) He had a successful military career but 
he retired from it to take a position at the company he expected would be funded 
by Sandra. (Transcript at 146-48.) He was taking care of his children and meeting 
the obligations of everyday life. When the marriage dissolved, James was 
essentially destitute. (Transcript at 131.) He no longer owned a home but had to 
reside with his parents. (Transcript at 168.) He no longer had his military career. 
(Transcript at 147-48.) 
By any measure, Sandra retains well over $2 million in value (including the 
Wasatch property) as of the date of trial. Depending on the exact amount that she 
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...u, ;^.ci- UK.: marriage begai 1, tl lat is approxii iiatel) 1 0 50°/ o of"t! le \ a li ic tl lat si n :: 
I :n c »i i r] ill ti: > t l i e i i lai riage Jai i les, oi I the otl ler hai id, 1: las \ Irti lally nothing except the 
- .
 s. ejL sioc\^ which has not been valued. In terms of losses, the equities 
certainly weigh in favor of James, not Sandra. 
CONCLUSION 
T7
~- nil oi ihc ioregoing reasons, James asks tins ( ourt to reverse the 
dcLi-.iui. « ...c ,;;... , . , * i .- itv h"o|KTly was nun 
p i n p i / M v ,11in 1 hoMI I | M ( lit" • • * " u%Ki f l u / i n n T h i s ( ( i i i i l 
•PIIOIIIII Ihen reniiiml. this c:* io Ihc inal court lor cnuy of an order awarding James 
one-half the value of the Wasatch property, as proven at trial. 
DATED this 3 d day of January, 2011 
" F II I MOR E SPEN CER , I I C 
Matthew R. Howell 
3301 N. University Avenue 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this 3d day of January, 
2011, to the following: 
Brent Young 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North #210 
Provo, Utah 84603 
-K 
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, p i r 
P) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced U~ 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, d^puied, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before or after transfer, 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether 
the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if 
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; 
and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining 
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, 
debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may be given, among 
other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or 
threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the 
value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the 
assets to an insider of the debtor. 
2S-0-0. Fraudulent transtc* * iaim aiiMu^ in-tori transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent a^  to a creditor whose 
claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation wa-, inc.inwl if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and 
\ h) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the transfer or 
i 13 A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the 
transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was 
insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was 
insolvent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8 
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors. 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject 
to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property 
of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil 
procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset 
transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the 
transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the 
court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds. 
57-1-5. Creation of joint tenancy presumed — Tenancy in common — 
Severance of joint tenanc) - . enants by the entirety — Tenants holding as 
community property. 
(1) (a) Beginning on Ma\ : - 1W7, e\er\ ownership interest in real estate 
granted to two persons in their *u n ugm uho are designated as husband and wife 
in the granting documents is pr:sumed to be a joint tenancy interest with rights of 
survivorship, unless severed, converted, or expressly declared in the grant to be 
otherwise. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 
BRENT I). VOl INC ^5M) 
IVIE& YOUNG 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
226 West 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
Fax:(801)375-3067 
IN THE FOl'RTII DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR \ I \ 11 I "< H M \ ^ TATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA POLL, nka SANDRA SI KAUB, 
Petit .. , 
v. 
JAMES COOK POLL, 
Respondent. 
si PPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
^ND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 094400044 
Commissioner: Tom Patton 
Judge: Fred Howard 
I he above ei rtitled n lattei can le oi i befoi e tl le coi u: t fc i ti iai, the I lonorable I h ed D. 
Howard presiding. Petitioner, Sandra Poll, now known as Sandra Straub, was present, 
•pi "* ' - : r% l .-.:iij.. Ki:s[»;iui, i>,. .Uiiiic c t,uk ; .., was present and represented by 
Matthew R. Howell. Witnesses were sworn and testified. The court entertained argument of 
COUTV , i .i\ni thereafter entered its ruling on the record and accepted a partial stipulation The 
com t now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF F A C T 
1- P< stitionei Sandi : i Si t ai il > fib i Sandr; 11 \ >11, anc I Resp< )i ident, Jai i les Cc K ik I "oil, 
were married on April 8, 2005. 
RLED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
— ~ i « _ u e p u t y 
2. The court finds there are no children of this relationship, and none are expected. 
3. The court finds Petitioner's former husband died in Building Number 2 of the 
World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010, 
page 5 line 3, page 34 line 2). 
4. The court finds Petitioner received one million dollars from the American Bar 
Endowment. (Transcript dated May 12, 1010 page 34 line 16). 
5. . The court finds Petitioner received about 3.8 million dollars from the 9/11 
Victim's Compensation Fund. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 35, line 16). 
6. The court finds Petitioner also received money from a life insurance company, in 
an amount which she did not specifically recall, as well as stock disbursements from a 401k. 
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 35, lines 19-22). 
7. The court finds Petitioner placed the money in trust into a trust account in her 
name. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 36, line 1, Petitioner's Exhibit 1). 
8. The court finds Petitioner also received money from the sale of a home in Boston, 
Massachusetts, which money was put into the trust account. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 
page 106, line 15). 
9. The court finds Petitioner purchased a home in Georgia, in her name. She made 
six monthly payments in the amount of $2,596.39. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9). She retired the 
mortgage on the Georgia home in the amount of $462,948.80. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9). It was 
stipulated these funds were the Petitioner's separate premarital funds which came from the trust. 
10. The court finds the parties lived in the Georgia home. Mr. Poll and his four 
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children, and Mrs. Poll and her two children, all resided in the home. Mr. Poll and his children 
resided in the home from March 15 or 16th' (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 123 line 24), 
the time the home was purchased and Mrs. Poll, and her children moved to the Georgia home 
approximately two months later. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 124 line 1). They resided 
in the Georgia home until the parties moved to Utah on about the July 3, 2008. (Transcript dated 
May 12, 2010 page 131, line 13). 
11. The court finds Respondent had essentially no living expenses for approximately 
3 1/2 years. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 107 line 18). In this regard the court finds 
Mrs. Poll's testimony credible. 
12. The court finds the Georgia home was sold at a loss of approximately $ 150,000. 
The proceeds from the sale of the Georgia home were, during these proceedings, held at a local 
bank. The proceeds were approximately $390,000. Mr. Poll stipulated that Mrs. Poll, nka 
Straub, could be awarded the proceeds from the sale of the Georgia home. (Transcript dated 
May 12, 2010 page 8 lines 4-17, page 124 line 25). 
13. The court finds Petitioner invested money in a business called StimTrainer. The 
initial investment was approximately $150,000. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 137, line 
23), and eventually the total investment was approximately $350,000, (Transcript dated May 12, 
2010 page 137, line 25) or $400,000. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010, page 144, lines 7-9). The 
Respondent invested time and energy (Transcript dated May 12, page 146). It was stipulated 
during the second day of trial that the Petitioner's shares of StimTrainer would be endorsed to 
Mr. Poll, and certain items of other personal property and cash in the amount of $13,950 would 
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be delivered to Mr. Poll in satisfaction of his claims with respect to personal property, the 
parties' vehicles, claims for moving expenses from Georgia to Utah, as well as the Petitioner's 
rights as a shareholder in StimTrainer. The specific stipulation is set forth beginning on page 5, 
line 9, of the Transcript dated 13 May, 2010, and summarized hereafter: 
a. Mr. Poll is awarded the Toyota Tundra pick-up truck. 
b. Mr. Poll is awarded any and all interest that Ms. Poll may have in StimTrainer 
Corporation, and Ms. Poll will endorse her stock certificates to Mr. Poll. 
c. Mr. Poll is entitled to have a third party pick up Mr. Poll's children's bedroom 
sets. Mr. Poll is not to go to Ms. Poll's home. 
d. Ms. Poll will pay Mr. Poll the sum of $13,950 within 14 days of the date of the 
trial. 
e. Mr. Poll will hold Ms. Poll harmless for any of the moving costs from the move 
from Georgia to Utah. 
f. A Mutual Restraining Order will enter between the parties and neither party will 
harm, molest, harass, or otherwise interfering with the lives of the other. 
g. Mr. Poll is entitled to the following pre-marital property: Two racquetball rackets; 
one gas weed-eating trimmer; and one six-foot step ladder. 
h. Mr. Poll is awarded the Georgia trailer. 
i. Ms. Poll retains the Toyota Avalon, and retains all right, title and interest in the 
Avalon. 
j . Mr. Poll is awarded any other property, not specifically referenced in the 
agreement, which is currently in his possession. 
k. A portion of the transcript is set forth hereafter regarding the Wasatch County 
property. 
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THE COURT: He concedes that she retains all right, t it le, and interest 
to the Wasatch property. 
MR. YOUNG: Right. 
THE COURT: Excepting the right of appeal. 
MR. HOWELL: Well, and the - yes. That is correct. 
THE COURT: He is conceding his nominal interest here. 
MR. HOWELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: - - to her. But he is retaining his right of appeal on the 
legal question. 
MR. HOWELL: Yes. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 6 lines 15-25, page 7, line 
1). 
THE COURT: Excepting you are reserving your right of appeal on the 
Wasatch property? 
MR. YOUNG: Right. 
MR. HOWELL: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that - - any other corrections? 
MR. YOUNG: I can't think of any. 
MR. HOWELL: No, Your Honor. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 8, lines 11-
18). 
1. Each party will pay their own attorney's fees. 
m. Each party is responsible for any debts incurred since the time of separation. 
14. The driving issue in this case is How is the Wasatch County property, purchased 
with $2,303,394.90 of Mrs. Poll's separate funds, to be divided? The court must first determine 
if this property is marital property or separate property. On remand the Hodge court stated the 
rule that the trial court has the obligation to first determine if property is marital or separate, 
divide the marital property, and return the separate property, unless there is a reason for division 
of the separate property. Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 UT App 394 \5, 174 P.3d 1137; Conundrum 
Revisited, David S. Dolowitz, Utah Bar Journal, Volume 23, No. 3, May/June 2010. 
15. For the reasons more specifically set forth hereafter the court finds the property to 
be separate, and is to be awarded to Sandra Poll. 
16. The court finds the $2,253,394.99, and the down payment of $50,000, with 
respect to the Wasatch County property, came exclusively from the Petitioner's trust, (Transcript 
dated May 12, 2010 page 58 line 17, Transcript dated 18 May page 5 line 2). This purchase of 
thirty-seven (37) acres, and a water right comprised of 52 shares in Daniel Irrigation Company, 
was purchased in Wasatch County on or about July 20, 2006. 
17. The court finds the real estate purchase contract initiated on May 18, 2006 
designated the buyer as James C. and Sandra Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) 
18. The court finds the Warranty Deed from the grantor, Ross Ewing Bethers and 
Juanita K. Bethers, to the grantee, James C. Poll and Sandra Poll as husband and wife, was 
signed on the 20th day of July 2006. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) 
19. The court finds the Warranty Deed was signed by James C. Poll and Sandra Poll 
on the 16th day of March 2007 with James C. Poll and Sandra Poll as grantors, conveying the 
Wasatch County property to Sandra Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) 
20. The court finds there is no dispute with respect to the source of the money for the 
purchase of the Wasatch County property. That source was Petitioner's, Sandra Poll's, trust. 
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 58 line 23) 
21. The court finds Mr. Poll asserted the theory that a one-half interest in this 
property had been a gift to him. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 190, line 11). On direct 
examination, he claimed that the property was a gift. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 163 
line 19). 
22. The court finds Mr. Poll claimed the reason the parties signed the Warranty Deed 
on the 16 day of March 2007 was out of concern that potential creditors may be able to reach 
him personally, acting as the President of StimTrainer. He testified "That was the sole reason for 
me" for the transfer of the property to Mrs. Poll. (Transcript dated 12 May 2010, page 166 line 
3, and Transcript dated 18 May 2010 page 5 lines 7-16). 
23. The court finds Mrs. Poll, the Petitioner, testified that she never intended to make 
a gift of the Wasatch County property to Mr. Poll. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 44 lines 
13-14) and that shortly after the documents were signed she became "terribly concerned." 
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 44, line 19, Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 5 line 17). 
24. The court finds that it is undisputed (Transcript dated 12 May 2010 page 201) that 
the parties made a considerable effort throughout the course of their marriage to keep their assets 
separate. The court finds they did join in terms of actual operating expenses such as groceries 
and household goods, but there was a continued separation of their accounts. (Transcript dated 
May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 17-23). 
25. The court finds the evidence is unpersuasive that Petitioner, Mrs. Poll, intended to 
make a gift of any portion of the Wasatch County property and the accompanying water right 
property to Mr. Poll. It is undisputed that Mrs. Poll paid the entire purchase price of 
approximately $2,300,000. 
26. The court finds what is more specific and clear about the testimony from Mr. Poll 
that it was his intent to convey this property from his estate for purposes of sheltering it from 
creditors, with the specific intent of removing it from his estate getting it out of his estate, and 
restoring it to hers. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010, page 202 line 24 through page 203 line 5). 
27. Therefore, the court finds the stronger evidence is that of an intention to keep the 
property separate. In this regard the court finds the evidence of Sandy Poll to be credible, and 
the evidence offered by Mr. Poll to be not credible. 
28. The court finds there was little or no credible testimony from the defendant 
regarding the transfer that the parties agreed the title, though transferred to Petitioner, would still 
remain joint marital property in terms of specific reference during the discussions. (Transcript 
dated May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 19-24). 
29. The court finds it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Poll's objective 
would constitute a potentially fraudulent conveyance. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 6 
line 5). The title transfer reflects his intention that his estate not include the Wasatch County 
property and that it would be the separate property of Mrs. Poll. However, now he seeks before 
a court of equity to claim a one-half interest in that properly. 
30. The court is aware of the case of Hone v. Hone, 95 P.3d 1221 (Utah App. 2004). 
In the Hone case, two brothers, Alton Hone and Lloyd Hone, desired for their mother to receive 
Medicaid benefits when she became ill. They sought a way for their mother to receive Medicaid 
benefits without subjecting their mother's homestead to a Medicaid lien. Lloyd Hone reported to 
his brother Alton Hone that the Medicaid lien could be avoided if the homestead were transferred 
to Lloyd, because Lloyd had been living in the house and taking care of their mother. Lloyd 
Hone promised his brother that if the homestead were transferred to him, he, Lloyd, would 
transfer the home back to the trust after their mother died. Presumably, Alton would then 
participate in the trust. 
31. After their mother died, Lloyd refused to transfer the homestead back to the trust. 
Alton sued Lloyd, seeking to have the property transferred to the trust. The trial court refused to 
reform the deed to place the ownership back in the trust. The court ruled that Lloyd's promise to 
transfer the property was unenforceable. Interestingly, the court concluded that Alton, as trustee, 
had deceived Medicaid about the true nature of the transfer from the trust to Lloyd, and thus had 
unclean hands. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 pages 6 and 7). 
32. The Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded for the reason that "Because Alton 
Hone deceived Medicaid under the only legal theory by which Alton Hone is entitled to 
equitable relief, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the doctrine of unclean 
hands applied to Alton Hone." (at page 1224). 
33. The court finds a similar principle applies here. Mr. Poll claims to have 
transferred the property for an improper purpose. Specifically, ".. .by his own testimony [Mr. 
Poll] has explained the intention of the parties by agreement to convey this property from his 
estate for purposes of sheltering it from creditors with the specific intent of getting it out of his 
estate and putting it into hers." (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 203 lines 1-5). 
34. Now Mr. Poll asks a court of equity to reform the very deed, which in his view, 
and if not in his view the court's view, had as its objective an improper purpose. He cannot be 
heard to complain even if there had been no actual fraudulent conveyance. (Transcript dated 
May 18, 2010 page 10 lines 3-5). 
35. The court finds based upon the facts as the court has found, combined with the 
overall history of the respective party's marital contributions, including the substantial losses 
incurred, and then by weighing the equities, the court finds it would not be unjust for Mrs. Poll to 
retain the Wasatch County property and water right as her separate property. 
36. The court finds Petitioner shall be awarded the Toyota Avalon and Chevrolet 
Suburban. 
37. The court finds Petitioner shall be awarded the three (3) St. Thomas Marriott 
International timeshares and hold Mr. Poll harmless from any financial obligation. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) The court concludes the parties' partial stipulation is reasonable and acceptable. 
(2) The court concludes that it is equitable concerning all of the circumstances 
surrounding the acquisition of the Wasatch County property and accompanying water, to award 
that property and accompanying water to Petitioner, Sandra Poll, nka Sandra Straub, as her 
separate property. 
Dated this/§L day of /£&&&/ , 2010. 
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Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE& YOUNG 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
226 West 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
Fax:(801)375-3067 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA POLL, nka SANDRA STRAUB, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMES COOK POLL, 
Respondent. 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
Civil No. 094400044 
Commissioner: Tom Patton 
Judge: Fred Howard 
Based on the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed herewith, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The parties' partial stipulation as set forth in the Findings of Fact is reasonable 
and acceptable, and is summarized hereafter. 
It was stipulated during the second day of trial that the Petitioner's share of StimTrainer 
would be endorsed to Mr. Poll, and certain items of other personal property and cash in the 
amount of $13,950 would be delivered to Mr. Poll in satisfaction of his claims with respect to 
personal property, the parties' vehicles, claims for moving expenses from Georgia to Utah, as 
well as the Petitioner's rights as a shareholder in StimTrainer. The specific stipulation is set 
FILED 
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of Utah County. State of Utah 
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forth beginning on page 5, line 9, of the Transcript dated 13 May, 2010, and summarized 
hereafter: 
a. Mr. Poll is awarded the Toyota Tundra pick-up truck. 
b. Mr. Poll is awarded any and all interest that Ms. Poll may have in StimTrainer 
Corporation, and Ms. Poll will endorse her stock certificates to Mr. Poll. 
c. Mr. Poll is entitled to have a third party pick up Mr. Poll's children's bedroom 
sets. Mr. Poll is not to go to Ms. Poll's home. 
trial. 
d. Ms. Poll will pay Mr. Poll the sum of $13,950 within 14 days of the date of the 
e. Mr. Poll will hold Ms. Poll harmless for any of the moving costs from the move 
from Georgia to Utah. 
f. A Mutual Restraining Order will enter between the parties and neither party will 
harm, molest, harass, or otherwise interfering with the lives of the other. 
g. Mr. Poll is entitled to the following pre-marital property: Two racquetball rackets; 
one gas weed eating trimmer; and one six foot step ladder. 
h. Mr. Poll is awarded the Georgia trailer. 
i, Ms. Poll retains the Toyota Avalon, and retains all right, title and interest in the 
Avalon. 
j . Mr. Poll is awarded any other property, not specifically referenced in the 
agreement, which is currently in his possession. 
property. 
A portion of the transcript is set forth hereafter regarding the Wasatch County 
THE COURT: He concedes that she retains all right, title, and interest 
to the Wasatch property. 
MR. YOUNG: Right. 
THE COURT: Excepting the right of appeal. 
MR. HOWELL: Well, and the - yes. That is correct. 
THE COURT: He is conceding his nominal interest here. 
MR. HOWELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: - - to her. But he is retaining his right of appeal on the 
legal question. 
MR. HOWELL: Yes. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 6 lines 15-25, page 7, line 
1). 
THE COURT: Excepting you are reserving your right of appeal on the 
Wasatch property? 
MR. YOUNG: Right. 
MR. HOWELL: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that - - any other corrections? 
MR. YOUNG: I can't think of any. 
MR. HOWELL: No, Your Honor. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 8, lines 11-
18). 
1. Each party will pay their own attorney's fees. 
m. Each party is responsible for any debts incurred since the time of separation. 
2. The Wasatch County property and accompanying water are awarded to Petitioner, 
Sandra Poll, nka Sandra Straub, as her separate property. 
3. Petitioner is awarded the Toyota Avalon and Chevrolet Suburban. 
4. Petitioner is awarded the three (3) St. Thomas Marriott International timeshares 
and hold Mr. Poll harmless from any financial obligation. 
Dated this /£_ day of jfaj.te>/ 2010. 
NOTICE TO RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for respondent, will submit the 
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and 
SUPPLEMENT DECREE, to the court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from 
your receipt of this notice, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is hereby certified thatcopies of the same were mailed, via first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following this Jf day of July, 2010. 
Matthew Howell 
Attorney at Law 
3301 N. University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
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Trial Court's Oral Ruling on May 12, 2010 That 
Wasatch Property Is Separate Property 
1 THE COURT: Thank you. 
2 MR. HOWELL: Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Young, your arguments are 
4 unnecessary. Ifm prepared to make a decision. 
5 Let me just say a couple of things in 
6 observations. I have no criticism of the parties and I 
7 have some empathy and sympathy for you in your position. 
8 And I -- I don't know that I understand and appreciate 
9 why this marriage has failed because you seem like 
10 decent, good people, and you have my respect. 
11 J I've tried to listen carefully to the evidence 
12 J and I would make the following observations, among other 
13 things. A gift is generally thought of as a gratuitous, 
14 voluntary conveyance without consideration and with 
15 intention to make a gift. There might be a better 
16 definition but that's the theory. 
17 What is undisputed in this case that I've 
18 heard today is that the parties made a considerable 
19 effort, and one which they continued throughout the 
20 J course of their marriage, to keep their assets separate. 
21 They did join them in terms of mutual operating expenses 
22 such as groceries and household, but there was a 
23 continued separation of their accounts. 
24 Their -- there's a disagreement as -- as to 
25 some of the facts regarding the transaction with the 
Wasatch property. 
The Plaintiff suggests that she paid no 
attention to the title instruments. 
The Defendant suggested that he was pleased to 
find that it was in both names and that it was done at 
her behest. 
And now I have also the proffered testimony of 
the realtor to suggest that it was done at her behest 
and construction of fact that is rebutted by the 
Plaintiff. I don't have, absent that realtor, other 
evidence that she made an unequivocal statement of her 
intention to give the property. And it is not uncommon 
for parties to hold property in their -- in the title 
for convenience purposes. 
That being said, I donft disagree with 
Mr. Howell's argument about the Mortensen case in that 
it offers a suggestion of an intention of a gift. 
Therefore I would say, suggest to you that I 
had thought that the -- that evidence is unpersuasive of 
her intention to divide the property as a gift. That 
being said, however, the Court also observes the second 
conveyance of, I think it was Exhibit 4, Exhibit 4, the 
eight or nine months after. 
What is more specific and more clear about 
that testimony and evidence is that the Defendant, by 
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1 his own testimony, has explained the intention of the 
2 parties by agreement to convey this property from his 
3 estate for purposes of sheltering it from creditors with 
4 the specific intent of getting it out of his estate and 
5 putting it into hers. 
6 They donft offer any other testimony or 
7 evidence that they intended to keep the property, enjoy 
8 it mutually, or — or not -- not have it, as a separate 
9 property. That, therefore, in my opinion, is stronger 
10 evidence of an intention to keep the property separate 
11 at that time. 
12 I do not conclude that the parties did not 
13 make considerable separate contributions to the 
14 marriage, and they have been articulated to some degree 
15 in terms of contributions to marital expenses, repair of 
16 the Georgia house and whatnot. 
17 And I also believe that they each made efforts 
18 to protect the property, and in that sense the Defendant 
19 may have some equitable interest in the property, but I 
20 do not view that to be a large one. I view that to be 
21 rather nominal in comparison to the value of the 
22 property as a whole, and I think that the Plaintiff made 
23 like efforts. 
24 And so I am concluding that this property is 
25 separate. 
A D D E N D U M E 
Trial Court's Oral Supplementation on May 18, 
2010 as to the Reasons for Its Ruling That the 
Wasatch Property is Separate Property 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (In Chambers.) 
3 THE COURT: We'll go on the record. This is 
4 the Poll versus Poll case, 94400044. 
5 At the Court's request I wanted to have a 
6 brief conference with counsel. I'll note Mr. Young is 
7 present. Mr. Howell likewise is present, each without 
8 their clients or the parties. 
9 What I wanted to do, break -- frankly, is 
10 supplement the record with a few statements of the Court 
11 as to the Court's reasoning. And I had attempted to do 
12 this earlier but I was unable to get with you before 
13 this hour. But I thought it might be beneficial because 
14 I didn't — I don't know that I did an adequate job in 
15 expressing the Court's reasoning. So let me make these 
16 I observations, and then of course you can respond if you 
17 think it is necessary or advised. 
18 This has to do with the division of the 
19 J Wasatch property or the claims regarding the Wasatch 
20 property. Among other things, the Court notes that the 
21 J property was deeded from the sellers to the Plaintiff 
22 and the Defendant. The Defendant testified and asserted 
23 I that the transfer was for joint marital purposes as he 
24 described I think in his testimony. And generally 
25 speaking, I think the Plaintiff described that and 
asserted that she didn!t pay attention to the title. 
I think it is undisputed that the Plaintiff 
paid virtually for all of the Wasatch property from 
premarital separate money of hers, and -- and then, 
subsequently, I think it is undisputed that a second 
title deed was executed. 
The Defendant, regarding that second title 
deed, intended — my observation was that the Defendant 
testified and asserted that he had talked to the 
Plaintiff and determined to transfer title to the 
Plaintiff because of fear of a possible legal claim or 
action by, my recollection, his shareholder of 
StimTrainer -- is it StimTrainer -- which was without 
insurance and for whom for which he served as an officer 
or director and had some exposure for personal 
liability. The Plaintiff testified words to the effect 
that she did not care and was relieved to have title 
returned to her, among other statements. She said that. 
My recollection is that there was little or no 
testimony from the Defendant that, regarding that 
transfer, that the parties agreed that the title, though 
transferred to Plaintiff, the property would still 
remain joint marital property in terms of specific 
reference during that -- those discussions. 
Now, I -- it is my view that by the 
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Defendant's testimony it is undisputed that his 
characterization of the purpose of the transfer was to 
protect the property from potential claims of 
shareholders, and it would not be unreasonable to 
conclude that that would constitute potentially a 
fraudulent conveyance. The title transfer reflects 
his — his intention that his estate not include the 
Wasatch property and that the -- it would be the 
separate property of Mrs. Poll for that purpose, then he 
comes to court and seeks an equitable claim of one-half 
of that property. 
And the Court observes, and I just make 
reference to a case that the Court had some years ago, I 
don't have the citation but I think it is the case of 
Holt versus Holt. It was a civil proceeding, not a 
divorce proceeding. It had to do with the partition 
action of property held by the Holt family in Pleasant 
Grove. 
And -- and it had -- it had may be not similar 
circumstances, but analogous circumstances, in which the 
property was conveyed from the father to his son for 
purposes of avoiding a Medicaid lean. And the Court 
heard -- and then the son refused to share the property 
with other siblings when the father was deceased. 
The Court exercised its discretion and 
1 required that division, and it went up on appeal and 
2 they examined that matter. This is my recollection. I 
3 apologize I don't have the — the reference to that. 
4 But the Court -- my opinion -- my belief is 
5 that the court affirmed the notion that transfers with 
6 I such intentions, and then notwithstanding those 
7 objections, the sibling refused to transfer the property 
8 to share with the other siblings, that the Court 
9 affirmed the trial court's order that he could not --
10 should not be heard to complain under such circumstances 
11 J because he seeks equity in light of those objectives. 
12 So, that is this Court's opinion regarding 
13 this property, that those intention -- given the 
14 characterization of those intended -- of those 
15 J intentions regarding the transfer, and the facts as I 
16 have noted them, combined with the overall history of 
17 the respective party marital economic contributions, and 
18 then weighing the equities, I find it would not -- it 
19 would be — I find it is not unjust for the Plaintiff to 
20 retain the property as her separate property. 
21 So, I want to supplement the explanation to 
22 suggest that given the characterization of a potential 
23 fraudulent conveyance, as well as the equitable 
24 relation — the equitable position of the parties in 
25 history and contributions, that was the basis for the 
1 Court's decision. And I didn't think I gave an adequate 
2 explanation of that. And so I supplement the record and 
3 I invite your response. 
4 MR. HOWELL: Well — 
5 THE COURT: If any. 
6 MR. HOWELL: Okay. Obviously, my client 
7 disagrees with that position --
8 THE COURT: Disagrees. 
9 MR. YOUNG: -- for a couple of reasons. 
10 J One, as I understood the Court's explanation 
11 of the Holt case, the transfer of property from one 
12 holder to another for specific legal purposes did not 
13 defeat the beneficial interests that others would have 
14 in that property, and I think that's the situation here. 
15 It was transferred for a specific legal purpose to 
16 protect the asset from legal claims of shareholders or 
17 others, but it would not defeat my client's beneficial 
18 interest in that property, if I understood the 
19 Court's — 
20 THE COURT: No. I actually think that is not 
21 the ruling of Holt. 
22 MR. HOWELL: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: I think that he seeks — the 
24 suggestion is that his -- what might be viewed by some, 
25 some -- I don't think it is an unreasonable conclusion, 
given his characterization that that might constitute a 
fraudulent conveyance, which would be contrary to the --* 
an equitable claim that he makes --
MR. HOWELL: Well, in my — 
THE COURT: — and his — and that, as well as 
his intention to convey the property from his estate to 
her separate estate, is evidence of his intention to 
transfer the title. 
MR. HOWELL: In responding to that, it seems 
to me, if it was indeed a fraudulent transfer, 
effectively he hasnft transferred it because that will 
be brought -- if a claim comes against him and -- and is 
held -- you know, if he is held liable and they need to 
collect, they will be able to go after that property so 
he effectively has not transferred. 
THE COURT: My understanding and opinion is it 
is not necessary that it actually be effective. 
MR. HOWELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: You see what Ifm saying? 
MR. HOWELL: And I do. And I seem -- it seems 
to me, that given the -- it was an ineffective transfer 
for legal purposes, how could it possibly be considered 
an effective transfer for beneficial purposes. 
THE COURT: I think the concept is it is not 
clean hands analogy, that he comes to court with unclean 
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hands but seeks equitable relief. And my understanding 
and belief is that it is a discretionary standard and 
under those circumstances he could not be held to 
complain even if there had been no actual fraudulent 
conveyance. 
MR. HOWELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: I am just explaining what I — 
MR. HOWELL: And I understand. And I am just 
explaining my clients --
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You are 
making your record. 
MR. HOWELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Any other record you want to make? 
MR. HOWELL: On this particular issue, no. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young? 
MR. YOUNG: No, sir. 
Oh, one thing. Yes. And it is just 
administrative. And if you'll indulge me for just a 
minute. 
The — I remember being in Judge Harding's 
court and Judge Bullock's court, and I remember them 
each telling me the same thing when they had ruled for 
my client or the other client, they would say "You are 
to go through the record and you are to put every fact 
in the findings" --
